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STABILITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE
U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HOPE AND FEAR
Guillermo F. Margadant*
In this academic-pragmatical event, I want to stress seven basic
facts, none of which will be surprising or produce shocking revela-
tions. However, a general picture springs from these facts, estab-
lishing clear tasks for the near future-tasks to which both coun-
tries should dedicate their attention.
I. STABILITY
Stability does not mean lack of change. It means gradual
change-a rhythm that will forestall tensions that could lead to ab-
rupt change. A bicycle provides the perfect example. If you immo-
bilize the handlebars for several seconds you may have an illusion
of stability; then abrupt change will probably occur, resulting in a
crash or fall. Flexibility is necessary for long-term stability in rela-
tions between nations, as well as on a bicycle. In U.S.-Mexico rela-
tions, this principle of gradual change has been violated many times
during this decade. This is illustrated in the following examples:
First, during the bulk of the Lopez Portillo regime, there was a
long, stubborn, overvaluation of the peso, leading to growing ten-
sion and contributing to Mexico's "economia-ficcion." In 1982 ab-
rupt change became unavoidable, causing the kind of shock that is
detrimental to the financial world and economic development in
general.
Second, in the autumn of 1982 when the Mexican crisis came
into the open, the Mexican government and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) worked out the Plan Immediato de Recupera-
cion Economica (PIRE). Implementing this plan was difficult for
Mexican authorities and became especially burdensome to the
poorer echelons of Mexico. However, macroeconomically speaking,
it worked well in 1983 and 1984. Mexico became a success story
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that the IMF could show to an admiring world forum. By the be-
ginning of 1985, the Mexican government, realizing that the impor-
tant mid-sexennium elections were approaching (in July), decided
to loosen the reins for awhile. The government wanted to create
optimism and popular confidence in growth, even if this was haz-
ardous to the struggle against inflation. The result of this sudden
interruption of the successful economic experiment was fatal. On
one hand, the elections were not the shining success the ruling
party had hoped for. Worse than that, the beast "inflation," once
out of his cage, did not allow the administration to put him back
again. Even the expected growth that sometimes balances inflation,
was an illusion. Thus, Mexico approached the first "crisis within
The Crisis," and the difficult restructuring of 1986.
Third, all mining, including mining for oil, is a gamble. Despite
official declarations to the contrary, Mexico has been "petrolizing"
its economy during the Lopez Portillo regime, making Mexico in-
creasingly dependent on an unstable market and exposing Mexico
to potential abrupt change.'
Fourth, second only to the wit and ingenuity of the Mexican peo-
ple, the U.S. border is Mexico's most important national asset. One
of its essential functions is being a security valve for our labor
world. Unilaterally, and on short notice, the United States is now
burdening Mexico with the risk of possibly seeing millions of Mexi-
can workers sent home to an unhinged economy. Apart from creat-
ing the problem of finding jobs for these people, this measure will
deprive Mexico of important dollars which these workers forwarded
home. In 1984 this amount was calculated to be roughly one billion
dollars.
Fifth, the growing dissatisfaction with the Partido Revolucionario
Institutional (PRI) and a change of sympathies in medium-sized
businesses have not found adequate political channels for manifes-
tation. This has been evident, especially in the North, in the recent
years of the present regime. Lack of flexibility in the ruling group
has increased tensions that have become visible to the outside
world. The international publicity given to the facts surrounding
1. A favorable aspect of Mexico's economic development last year (1986) was that the
non-oil exports suddenly increased to almost $10 billion dollars, representing two-thirds of
the total exportation. If this trend continues, the Government's decision to enter into the
GATT, last year, surrounded then by a rather violent polemical discussion, will turn out to
have been the right one. The main question involved was whether Mexican industry would be
able to correspond to the opportunities membership in the GATT would open. It seems it
was.
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the Chihuahua elections of 1986 was unfavorable to Mexico's in-
vestment climate and general image.' This incident illustrated how
insisting on the status quo can contribute to instability. A gradually
growing tolerance of opposition victories is more advisable.'
Finally, one can add the sudden ups and downs in the U.S. trade
policy with Mexico to this list.
In order to contribute to real stability, both countries need to
create an atmosphere of flexibility, foresight, and gradual change.
II. THE GOVERNMENT
The Mexican ruling party, the PRI, has created neither a demo-
cratic regime nor a one-party dictatorship. Modern "politology" la-
bels Mexico's type of government is an "authoritarian regime."
Sometimes, PRI officials present the Mexican regime as another
form of democracy and admonish foreign critics for not under-
standing the Mexican political style. However, political terms
should be kept straight. Even if manipulation of the press and large
scale corruption in elections are necessary for stability and pro-
gress, they should not be interpreted as belonging to "another style
of democracy.""
A favorable feature of PRI that critics do not easily recognize is
that since the Presidency of Lopez Mateos, the electoral system has
been changing gradually to the benefit of opposition parties. Mex-
ico's Constitution (changed in 1986), 5 foreseeably faces at least
30% opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. The initiative for these
changes came from the PRI, without whose collaboration none of
these successive political reforms would have been possible. Thus,
from the intermediate position of being an "authoritarian state,"
2. Mexico's Ruling Party Woos Leary State, Wall Street Journal April 27, 1987, at
14.
3. However, excessive concessions to electoral honesty would perhaps lead to another
abrupt change: the breaking away of the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM)
from the PRI.
4. The PRI government normally shows a reasonable respect for human rights, and in
spite of the favorable price of newsprint sold by a government organization, and attempts at
tying newspapers to the government by way of advertisement contracts with state-owned
enterprises (which creates in the world of our press an atmosphere of self-censorship), or
generous government gifts to key journalists, one must recognize that-especially in these
last years-there is in our newspapers a surprisingly free tone as to criticism of the official
policy, and that intimidation or violence as a means to keep the press polite, are rare.
5. Since the fifties, the federal election system foresees, in addition to representatives
elected by each electoral district, so-called "Diputados de Partido" for minority parties, ob-
tained by lumping together the minority vote of several districts. This system has been im-
proved gradually, especially during the Lopez Portillo regime (1976-1982) and again in
1986.
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there is a gradual movement occurring in Mexico towards a more
traditional form of democracy, including participatory democracy.6
No one denies there having been more manipulation of elections
in recent years than at the beginning of the de la Madrid regime.
7
But, it is obvious that this manipulation is under growing popular
protest, and protest within the party. The official attitude now in-
cludes gradually making concessions to the existing critics.8 The
slow adaptation to traditional democratic procedures, that the PRI
is allowing, corresponds to the advice of gradual and flexible
change. However, this rhythm of change may be slower than social
reality requires. Political tensions are building into what could eas-
ily lead to abrupt change, which Mexico must avoid at any price.
Mexico must admit another positive aspect of the PRI. Its ideol-
ogy is so amorphous, so flexible, that one often doubts if it really
exists. Elias Calles9 wanted this party to be a general framework
within which all kinds of pressure groups would be able to find an
arena for their activities without excessive danger of violent con-
flict. Though there have been several transformations since the late
twenties, the party has not yet lost this conciliatory dogmatical
spirit.
Pressure groups within the PRI include not only the Confedera-
cion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), Confederacion Nacional
Campesina (CNC), Confederacion Revolucionaria de Obreros
Mexicanos (CROM), Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones
Populares (CNOP) and so on, but also the Cardenistas, Alemanis-
tas, Echeverristas, and others. Albeit intra muros, between such
groups a certain give-and-take, a certain bargaining is taking place,
giving to the inside life of the PRI-and to Mexican political life in
general-a pluralistic atmosphere, totally alien to the ambience of
a truly autocratic "one-party" regime.
This ideological flexibility makes it easier for all kinds of people
interested in politics to join the PRI. While it may be true that the
6. Even if it is still defeated by a majority of PRI leaders, the Corriente Democra-
tizadora within the party, headed by the well-known echeverrista, Munoz Ledo, is an inter-
esting symptom.
7. A recent Gallup Poll (1986) attributes 40% of the popular favor to the PRI, 19% to
the PAN, less than 10% to the Left, and characterizes 30% as indifferent.
8. Transparent urns are being introduced and the new legislation of elections foresees
a Tribunal Electoral which, however, will not yet have the final word in electoral matters, as
this remains with special organizations within both Chambers of Congress.
9. President from 1924 to 1928, and then until 1934 the strong man behind the throne.
In 1929 he created the official party, which after two changes of name is now the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).
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leadership in Mexico adheres to an "official family," this elite is a
typical example of an "open elite."' 10 Professor Stanley Ross, at a
lecture given in the presence of ex-President Aleman, launched the
opinion that the PRI is, in reality, not a party but a political em-
ployment agency (indeed, deciding who will hold various positions
is one of the important practical aspects of the PRI).
The PRI also has a few feathers in its cap. As a partner in devel-
oping a livable relationship with Washington, it is an acceptable
party. It does not easily offend the sensitivity of human rights
groups. It is moving slowly towards a more pluralistic party system,
and it has been able to keep a certain degree of social and political
peace in Mexico, in spite of delicate circumstances. This latter
merit is especially noteworthy. Several times, agitation for national
strikes protesting increased prices has failed.
The unremarkable government action after the earthquake," the
failure of the PIRE due to a pre-election spending spree (after
which a painful hangover followed), the economic contraction in-
stead of recovery, the growth of unemployment and underemploy-
ment, the manipulation of elections, and the present UNAM
trouble (already on its way out), all could have been the origin of
an antigovernment protest movement of critical importance. How-
ever, nothing really dangerous happened. Even the wave of strikes
last summer (1986) did not shake the PRI government.
III. THE ECONOMY
One important fact that most cognoscenti reluctantly acknowl-
edge, is the sad reality that the economic crisis is not over, and
default could still become unavoidable during this regime. Until re-
cently, Mexico has been able, with outside help, to roll over its
debts so that it could pay the interest on them and receive addi-
tional money. This is not a real solution. Currently, servicing the
debt is draining Mexico of what it needs to abolish it. The loan
package restructuring the 1986 debt will increase Mexico's indebt-
edness to nearly $110 billion. This amount entails a service cost of
more than $9-10 billion annually.
Mexico's economic future depends a great deal upon the oil mar-
10. Once I was present at a confrontation between a small group of revolutionary stu-
dent leaders and a rather prestigious PRI politician, during which he gave them the advice of
not fighting the PRI; that would be immature, juvenile quijotism; but of joining the party
and then seeing how they could change it gradually from the inside.
11. See New Yorker IX 2g. 1986, at 46, col. 3.
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ket, but even if the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
(OPEC) succeed in stabilizing the price of oil at eighteen dollars
per barrel, Mexico's balance of payments still will not allow the
drain of hard currency necessary to service Mexico's debts. The
only way to solve Mexico's debt problem is growth.
Tourism and direct investment have declined. Capital flight12 will
continue to increase if no measures are taken against it. The ma-
quiladoras contribute $1-2 billion annually to increasing non-oil im-
ports.13 The swapping device number one, which turns our minor
external debts into authorized foreign investment, and swapping de-
vice number two, which turns corporate debts into equity, are help-
ful but do not bring in fresh investment money." These measures
do not generate amounts that will affect the essentially dangerous
panorama.
Oil will probably generate approximately $6-7 billion in 1987.
Non-oil export will probably generate between $12 and $14 billion.
Direct investment and tourism may generate between $2 and $3
billion, and credits arranged for in 1986 will improve our balance
of payments by an estimated $12 billion. However, money sent
home by illegal immigrants to the United States will decrease sub-
stantially. Although the drug trade will generate substantial bene-
fits for the mafia, these monies will probably not be invested in
Mexico. Only a small amount of this drug money will be used in
Mexico and trickle down to a few peasants. Opposite this inflow of
somewhat more than $35 billion, imports will cost approximately
$15 billion, interest approximately $11 billion, and an additional
unknown amount of new capital flight will occur. 5 The unknown
amounts for tourism and foreign service, which will also leave the
country, could be as high as $2 billion.
In spite of capital flight, a balance or a surplus of billions could
12. It is impossible to calculate this phenomenon exactly, but serious calculations by
United States banks suggest that Mexico's foreign indebtedness would be completely man-
ageable if it had not been for this loss of national capital.
13. From $7.6 billion in 1984 and $7.1 billion in 1985, non-oil exports have crept to
$9.5 billion in 1986, and realistically optimistic calculations project possibly $14 billion for
1987.
14. The first device consists of buying up at a discount parts of the Mexican foreign
debt, and obtaining a permit from Mexican authorities to change such documents into Mexi-
can pesos, to be invested in a way, especially approved by these authorities (see Time, Oct.
13, 1986, at 30, col.l); the second device consists of changing credits against Mexican firms
into capital participation.
15. Because of the scarcity of credit in Mexico, some capital was sent back to Mexico
in 1986 by Mexican businessmen who wanted to keep their enterprises going, and some
money came back in order to participate in the recent Mexican stock exchange boom, but
this is not a sign of increased confidence on the side of the "sacadolares."
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be achieved in 1987 if capital flight is slight. However, this depends
on the refinancing money acquired during 1986 and 1987. In 1988,
the surplus remaining from 1987 will help.
In 1989, new credit will no longer be available from commercial
banks (many smaller banks are still protesting against their forced
participation in the restructuring of 1986). Even if the oil market
increases to twenty dollars per barrel,16 the general prospects are
bleak. It is quite possible that by the end of 1988, based on a realis-
tic extrapolation of current trends, new emergency measures will be
necessary.
Even if the crisis has not yet hit bottom, popular misery has.
Minimum wages have lost 40% of their purchasing power. Unem-
ployment and underemployment seem to have reached a level of
about 40-50%. People who are dying of starvation are not usually
very docile, and against "necessity's sharp pinch" political rhetoric
offers no remedy. If totally fulfilling Mexican obligations creates
the danger of a social revolution, that, in turn, could mean the loss
of Mexican credit. In that situation a bilateral17 solution would be
preferable.' 8
IV. DEMOGRAPHICS
Behind the facade of Mexico's crisis lurks a force that has been
undermining Mexico for many years. It is not corruption, nor does
it consist of basic decisional errors of our governing elite. It is not
the natural inefficiency of state socialism nor the effect of showcase
investment (though all this has contributed, of course, to the pre-
sent situation). The undermining factor I refer to is the demo-
graphic curve. Some thirty years ago, the net increase in population
was 3.5% per year, a terrifying figure representing a duplication of
the population every twenty years. It has presently declined to
2.5%.'" Last year, Mexico received a United Nations prize for this
achievement. However, this recent favorable change will not imme-
16. For every one dollar increase in the oil price, the Mexican balance of payments
improves by approximately one-half billion.
17. Bilateral, but eventually under pressure of the threat of unilateral measures.
18. E.g., a drastic reduction of interest and postponement of the first reimbursement
installments for a long period, in addition to, possibly, a limitation of debt service to a certain
percentage of non-oil exportation, or a linking of payments to the oil price; and in the credi-
tor's countries, administrative concessions to the damaged banks could become necessary, so
that the loss could be spread over many years and would not affect immediately the value of
bank shares (which could have dangerous, panic-like consequences).
19. N. BAILEY & R. COHEN. THE MEXICAN TIME BOMB 8 (1987), P. SMITH, MEXICO,
NEIGHBOR IN TRANSITION 33 (1984).
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diately affect the need for Mexico to create approximately a million
new jobs per year. Although important, the maquiladora arrange-
ment is providing only a fraction of the needed increase in jobs.
The population statistics elucidate the difficult task of keeping the
country financially afloat, which faces the Mexican government.
V. UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS
Several past traumas have made collaboration between the two
governments a delicate matter. The past will be difficult to correct
because these old wounds have a useful function for the Mexican
government. There is an old Russian saying: "If you want to keep
peace in the family, hire a wolf to howl at your door." Because
Mexico is not psychologically integrated, the politicians are
tempted in times of crisis to unite people by exaggerating the Yan-
kee danger to the north. United States politicians must be careful
not to nourish Mexican diffidence, either by careless public accusa-
tions or by egotistical trade measures.
This ingrown diffidence on the side of many Mexican elites is not
necessarily justified in light of recent events. When the Mexican
debt crisis emerged, it was Washington that gave immediate help.
In addition, the United States went out of its way to get both pub-
lic and private institutions to help Mexico restructure its debt in
1986.20
Useful though this diffidence may sometimes be to Mexican poli-
ticians, it would be beneficial for Mexican intellectuals to attune
their people to the enormous amount of goodwill flowing from the
United States to Mexico. They should also realize the many uses to
which Mexico could put the real pluralism that characterizes the
U.S. political world.
VI. CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT
The PRI is not accustomed to accepting gracefully criticism of
its political routines and decisions, whether from Mexico or abroad.
The misery caused by the present crisis has made the Mexican pop-
ulation more vociferous in their criticism of the government. Addi-
tionally, foreign opinion regarding events in Mexico has suddenly
20. This was in the indirect interest of the United States, of course, but that is natural.
A government that would help another nation without some direct or indirect benefit for
their own citizens, probably should be impeached. Governments are not elected by their peo-
ple to play Santa Claus.
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proliferated due to the danger of financial default. Foreign markets
would feel the repercussions of Mexican default and even the possi-
bility of revolution would also affect the United States negatively.
Mexico is suddenly in the limelight, and much of what is being said
about the governing elite is not very flattering.
The Mexican government's irritation from such criticism com-
bines readily with the monolithical view of "Washington," which
even some well-educated Mexican intellectuals have. Upon hearing
that unpleasant things have been said about Mexican politics in the
Senate, they immediately suspect sinister motivations in President
Reagan's heart. They feel that the Mexican "sovereignty" has been
violated when any U.S. official criticizes the Mexican government,
and they incite mass protests against such "official Yankee hostil-
ity" toward Mexico.
Though open criticism is the raw material of democracy, the phe-
nomenon of opinions frankly disagreeing with PRI policy, not whis-
pered but openly expressed, is still something relatively new. A
more modern and democratic government attitude toward these
doubt-provoking manifestations of independent thinking is a shock-
ing novelty to many older politicians. Mexican intellectuals, more
attuned to the political structure of the United States, need to help
their government to feel less sensitive about criticism, whether it is
Mexican or foreign. Obviously, this will take some time.
VII. THE UNITED STATES' SPECIAL INTEREST
The final fact in this series is the vital interest the United States
and its politicians have in avoiding social upheavals in Mexico. This
interest springs from economic motivations related to United States
participation in the external Mexican debt. The United States
needs to protect its direct investments, its supplier position to Mex-
ico, and their consumer position in relation to Mexico as a Third
World neighbor. United States interest also springs from a more
important, geopolitical motive ("Geography is destiny .... .") Mex-
ico represents the "soft underbelly" of the United States at a time
when Soviet-inspired communist influence could be creeping
through the Caribbean and Central America. Trouble in Mexico
could force the United States to withdraw troops from Europe. Se-
rious trouble is not expected in the near future, but after four years
without economic growth (only population growth and growth of
indebtedness) the foundations of the traditional political stability of
Mexico are badly shaken.
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CONCLUSION
The United States cannot ignore Mexico's financial problems,
which could easily turn into social and political problems. There is
a reasonable chance that the Mexican crisis will deepen, in which
case the United States will probably become more involved in the
problems of its neighbor. In this respect, Washington will have to
deal with a government that is less democratic than many U.S. pol-
iticians and citizens would prefer. But this is the only government
Mexico has to offer for now, and it is probably better than most
alternatives available in the near future. The Mexican government
has shown over the past four years that it can handle a very diffi-
cult situation, without provoking-as yet-a clear danger of revolu-
tion. Another advantage of the Mexican political structure is its
dominance by the PRI-elite. This is an open elite which is not as
objectionable to a modern political point of view. Although the PRI
government has rhetorically insisted on sovereignty and dignity, it
has generally collaborated with the United States government and
the international financial-economic authorities regarding the eco-
nomic policy to be followed.
Mexico has been reducing or eliminating subsidies, even though
this has not contributed to the government's popularity. It has been
selling or dismantling many non-strategic government enterprises. 1
Mexico did enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), in spite of the fact that this decision was violently criti-
cized by influential groups. Mexico is revising the obsolete tax
structure, and within the framework of the existing investment law,
it has made its administrative policy more flexible. Thus, under the
present circumstances, I think that the United States would do it-
self a disservice if it were to weaken the Mexican government.
Extrapolating the trend, visible since the fifties, suggests that in
the long run Mexico will reach a two-party, or possibly a three-
party, system. But the U.S. government should not try to openly
accelerate this evolution, unless the Mexican government's rhythm
for change becomes so slow that dangerous tensions could result.
Discrete constructive criticism between governments can be help-
ful. Even official criticism open to the Mexican public might not
necessarily be disastrous. However, if the United States mentions
names, it should be able to back up its statements with evidence.
21. Even in a matter which is so delicate in internal Mexican politics as in the bank
nationalization, we see that the government is offering 34% of the bank shares to the public.
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United States politicians should recognize that Mexico is a very
difficult country to govern. In the matter of the transnational drug
trade, the resources of a Third World country in full crisis are con-
fronted with the unlimited financial resources of an international
mafia. The United States should recognize that many Mexican offi-
cials have been harmed while doing their duty to control drugs. The
relative lack of success in the field of drug repression by the U.S.
authorities has increased the stream of drugs through Mexico and
the drug production on Mexican soil. This does not mean that the
United States should not protest when it sees high ranking individ-
uals within the Mexican power structure sell favors to drug kings.
However, such protest would perhaps be more effective if it were
first presented in private and brought into the open only if there
was no response.
If the United States considers it worthwhile, for the time being,
to accept the PRI government as a partner, it has no reason to
weaken it. If the United States wants stability in Mexico it should
avoid political and economic shocks originating from economic
pressure groups, labor policies, and migration policies. In the at-
tempt to keep Mexico stable, foresight and gradual change must
have high priority.
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